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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/03/2004 Accident number: 262 
Accident time: 13:25 Accident Date: 30/10/1999 
Where it occurred: MNB South, Nr 
Ljubance 
Country: Kosovo 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?) 
Class: Victim inattention Date of main report: 11/12/1999 
ID original source: KC/MD/JF Name of source: KMACC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMA-2 AP blast Ground condition: leaf litter 
route/path 
Date record created: 18/02/2004 Date  last modified: 03/03/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: GR: DM 932 967 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate communications (?) 
metal-detector not used (?) 
 
Accident report 
An accident report was compiled for the country MACC and made available in January 2000. 
The following summarises its content. 
The group involved in the accident was a collaboration between two demining companies, 
with the SOPs of one group only being used. These involved the use of two-man teams in a 
one-man clearance drill. 
The accident occurred on a trail used as access to a village. Two accidents had occurred in 
the previous month [not recorded whether civilian or livestock] and the area had been given a 
high priority.  
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The demining team of seven (including one "doctor" and a supervisor) deployed at the site at 
08:10 and worked all morning. Mines found at the site were PMR2A "usually secured" by a 
PMA-2.  
After lunch four of the deminers were tasked to build a bridge over a creek to allow better 
access to the area being cleared. The remaining deminer and the supervisor cleared a one 
metre wide lane in order to examine a tripwire that had been spotted outside the working 
area. When they got close to the tripwire the supervisor took over clearance and worked for 
20 minutes. Then he "stood up, turned around and requested two more small pickets to mark 
his lane". While doing this he "lost his footing" and took a step backwards over his base stick 
with his right foot, which initiated a mine. This occurred at 13:25. 
Photographs of the site showed the victim's torn boot at the accident site. The victim's injuries 
were described as "right foot and minor injuries on left leg from blast", later expanded with the 
blast "took the heel of the right foot". The foot was subsequently amputated. 
The victim then "jumped on his left foot to the two metres safe lane where his number two 
deminer met him. He then reported himself to the Doctor on site". 
Helicopter Medevac from a landing site was immediately requested and the victim stabilised 
and prepared for the road journey to the helicopter landing site. All communications were by 
sat-phone. The victim left for the helicopter at 13:45 and arrived at 14:00. The helicopter 
arrived at 14:15 and landed at the medical facility at 14:50. 
The MAC investigators arrived at the site on the following day and were met by 
representatives of the clearance groups who provided a clearance team for the investigation. 
The area around the accident was cleared in order to allow better access to the investigators. 
This took three hours. During the clearance a "second PMA-2" was found within about a 
metre of the blast site [not measured but the distance is my estimation from a photograph]. 
The mine was found with a detector, and there was some doubt over whether the victim had 
been using a detector or prodding just prior to the accident. 
The use of PMA-2 blast mines to protect the tripwires of fragmentation mines was well known 
and anticipated. 
The investigators found that the victim had worked for the demining group for three years and 
had a further four year's relevant experience with the Bosnian army. The protective 
equipment he was wearing was a helmet and visor and a fragmentation vest. His boots were 
described as "normal working half boots".  
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim was experienced and working properly in 
accordance with the relevant SOPs. They recorded that the sat-phone was the only means of 
communication on the site. They added that the accident was "preventable". 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that "VHF communications" be established "as soon as 
possible", that the contracted partner in the clearance coalition must clarify with the MAC 
which group's SOPs were to be used, that refresher courses on drills (especially tripwire) 
must be carried out, and that the use of the detector whenever possible must be stressed.  
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 336 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 1 hour 25 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet, 
Short visor 
 




Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 
No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Unavoidable" because the victim appears to 
have been working in an approved way and simply lost his balance. Despite the fact that the 
MACC investigators considered this "avoidable", it is presumed that such examples of 
human-error are essentially unavoidable throughout the accidents in this database. The 
secondary cause is listed as “Victim inattention”. 
There was some confusion over which of the two demining group's SOPs were to be used, 
and whether the victim was using a detector prior to the accident. (There is some 
disagreement within the industry over the best way to search for minimum metal mines - 
thorough excavation or detection.) However, the accident occurred ahead of his base stick in 
an area that had not been searched, so it seems unlikely that these concerns reflect on the 
cause of the accident. 
The failure to have adequate on-site communication in place may be seen as a serious 
management failing and was highlighted in the investigation. 
The report demonstrates an unusually thorough and critical approach to accident 
investigation. The Mine Action Co-ordination Centre which carried out the investigation was 




The Accident report included pictures of the accident site which showed the victim's boot and 
others showing the second PMA-2 less than a meter to the left of the small crater caused by 
the first mine. (The second mine was found using one of the detectors used at the site.) 




The victim's protective equipment was also photographed. The visor appeared lightly 
scratched but this did not appear to have occurred in the accident. The victim's undamaged 
base-stick was also shown. 
In a summary on mine/UXO accidents in Kosovo, (undated but covering September 1999 - 
August 2000), it was stated that this accident "could definitely have been prevented". The 
summary included "Lessons learned" and listed: 
1) "Refresher on all clearance drills especially the tripwire drill procedure will have to be 
conducted. A particular attention to clearance on sloping ground must be given." 
2) "The metal detector must be used when there is no soil contamination." 
3) "Sub-contracted company must comply with the approved SOP from the MACC." 
4) "A radio communication network must be established as soon as a Mine Action 
Programme is initiated." 
  
In December 2001 the MACC reported that the Victim had recovered, got a prosthetic and 
was then working in Tusla, Bosnia. 
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